

~~SECRET~~

19 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Sino-Albanian Problem

1. The Board of National Estimates considers the attached memorandum on the Sino-Albanian problem sufficiently interesting to bring to your attention. The memorandum makes the following points:

a. Albania's recent intransigence against Moscow is motivated mainly by the obsession of the Albanian Communist leaders with Yugoslavia. Their fear that Khrushchev's policies would end up delivering Albania back to Tito is combined with a neurosis caused by the presence of latent pro-Yugoslav sympathies in Albania. These considerations were instrumental in causing the Albanian leaders to turn for support from the USSR to Communist China.

b. Albania's behavior is almost certainly a source of real concern to Moscow. The longer it is allowed to continue, the more difficult will be the problem of control over the

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other Bloc states. There is evidence that Moscow already has tried coercive measures, both economic and political, and that China has agreed to provide economic and technical support. With such backing, the Albanian economy is probably in a position to withstand even full Soviet economic sanctions.

c. The Soviets will want to avoid the use of force if ~~possible~~ possible. Short of this, Moscow now has few, if any, levers of control over the Albanian leaders, especially after the recent unsuccessful attempts to coerce them. Its immediate prospects for solving the Albanian problem are not bright, tied as it is to the more general and vital problem of Sino-Soviet differences. Just as the latter were not resolved by the Moscow conference, so the Albanians have not been brought into line. As a consequence, Moscow's relations with the other Bloc states will continue to be complicated not only by a Chinese, but by a Sino-Albanian problem.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

JEROME KENT
Chairman